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Introduction
Museum ethics have now entered the digital age, as have 
images and the copyrights pertaining thereto. In general 
terms, the law is regarded as a kind of minimum ethical 
standard. As a result, one could be inclined to believe 
that copyright can provide guidance as to how to handle 
reproduction rights in an ethically satisfactory manner. 
However, two cases – one very recent but already famous, 
and another, slightly less recent but arguably even more 
famous and highly disputed – show that copyright and 
the logic of rights and reproductions have their limita-
tions. It is suggested that current museum practice in view 
of copyright is to some extent unethical. To assess the eth-
ics of using reproductions of works of art in the public 
domain, the public domain first has to be reinstalled.
This paper will begin by examining two case studies. 
The first case involved the National Portrait Gallery in 
London and the Wikimedia Foundation. The second case, 
Bridgeman v. Corel, was decided by a New York court in 
1999. Next, the underlying copyright issues involved in 
the two cases will be assessed. The paper will conclude 
with some ethical considerations. 
1. Case studies
1.1 National Portrait Gallery (UK) v. Wikimedia 
Commons
The National Portrait Gallery in London (NPG) was founded 
in 1856. It is not an art museum as such, but focuses on 
collecting portraits of historically important people. Since 
1896, it has been based at St Martin’s Place in London, not 
far from the National Gallery. The gallery’s collections com-
prise more than 4,000 paintings, and some 6,800 works 
on paper, such as photographs and prints. Digitisation did 
not bypass the NPG, and it started making digital images 
of works from the collection available early in the twenty-
first century. The user can view images of specific works 
on the gallery’s website. Before the dispute of 2009, it was 
even possible to zoom in on details, by a high-resolution 
image being divided into tiles. Zooming in displayed only 
the relevant tiles of the image, and never the complete 
image in its high-resolution glory. The main reason for the 
use of such technology is to save bandwidth. Admittedly, 
the National Portrait Gallery also had in mind a rudimen-
tary form of protection against the images being copied in 
their maximum resolution.
In 2009, Derrick Coetzee, a graduate student at the 
University of California, Berkeley, wrote a script that down-
loaded the image tiles of more than 3,000 images from the 
National Portrait Gallery’s website and re-assembled them 
into complete, high-resolution images, which he then 
uploaded to the Wikimedia Commons repository on the 
Internet. In other words, the images that the NPG offered 
in tiles were now available in their entirety. Pursuant to UK 
law, these were all images in the public domain: the origi-
nal copyright holders had been dead for more than 70 
years (cf. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, section 
12, subsection 2). In a demand letter to Coetzee, however, 
the NPG claimed that its new photographic reproduc-
tions of the works in its collections were copyrighted 
works in their own right, and that the uploading of the 
images infringed both the NPG’s database rights and its 
copyrights (see the article ‘National Portrait Gallery and 
Wikimedia Foundation copyright dispute’ on Wikipedia, 
and a discussion of the case in Stokes 2012: 156–164).
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The matter never reached the courts, and the dispute 
was never properly settled. Instead, both parties eventu-
ally entered a dialogue in which they agreed to disagree. 
At a conference on galleries, libraries, museums and 
Wikipedia in the autumn of 2010, the head of the NPG’s 
rights and reproductions department, Tom Morgan, pre-
sented a paper analysing the unsatisfactory situation and 
the shared goals of both organisations, arguing for a new 
kind of relationship beyond the law (Morgan 2010). While 
the National Portrait Gallery allegedly wanted to avoid the 
Streisand effect, it’s reluctance to sue Coetzee might also 
have been the result of a case decided - twice - ten years 
earlier, Bridgeman v. Corel.
1.2 Bridgeman v. Corel
In 1998 and 1999, a District Court in the US state of New 
York decided the case of Bridgeman Art Library, LTD. v. Corel 
Corp., a decision that has divided opinion among experts 
ever since. Founded in 1972 by Harriet Bridgeman, the 
Bridgeman Art Library is an important archive for repro-
ductions of works of art. Corel is a Canadian software com-
pany. In the UK, the USA and Canada, it sold a CD-ROM 
containing digital images of paintings by European mas-
ters, all of which were in the public domain. Bridgeman 
claimed that it held the copyright to these images, argu-
ing that its own digital images were the only possible 
source of the images distributed by Corel, and that these 
copies were infringements of Bridgeman’s copyright. 
Corel denied that there was any copyright pertaining to 
the Bridgeman photographs.
While the details of the case and its rulings are intrigu-
ing in themselves, only parts are of interest here. In a first 
ruling on 13 November 1998 [The Bridgeman Art Library, 
Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421 (SDNY 1998)], Judge 
Kaplan granted the defendant’s motion for a summary 
dismissal of the suit. He argued that the issue of the copy-
rightability of photographs was governed by the law of 
the United Kingdom – where the photographs had origi-
nally been published – while the question of whether an 
infringement had occurred in the United States was a mat-
ter of United States law. Judge Kaplan applied the original-
ity test set forth in section 1, subsection 1 (a) CDPA (UK 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988), which protects 
‘original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works’ to the 
Bridgeman photographs. For a definition of originality, 
Kaplan cited Interlego AG v Tyco Industries Inc & Ors (Hong 
Kong) [1988] UKPC 3 (05 May 1988), RPC, 343, which 
had ruled that, in order to be original, works ‘need not be 
original or novel in form, but it must originate with the 
author and not be copied from another work’. (This was in 
itself a quote from another case, a summary by J Megarry 
in British Northrop Limited v. Texteam Blackburn Limited 
[1974] RPC 57, at 68.) Judge Kaplan concluded that the 
Bridgeman photographs ‘lacked sufficient originality to 
be copyrightable under United Kingdom law’. Indeed, 
they were meant to be faithful reproductions of the works 
of art that they represented. One could argue that such 
images are a priori not originals, as the Privy Council had 
pointed out in the Interlego case:
‘Take the simplest case of artistic copyright, a paint-
ing or a photograph. It takes great skill, judgment and 
labour to produce a good copy by painting or to produce 
an enlarged photograph from a positive print, but no 
one would reasonably contend that the copy painting or 
enlargement was an “original” artistic work in which the 
copier is entitled to claim copyright. Skill, labour or judg-
ment merely in the process of copying cannot confer orig-
inality. […] [C]opying, per se, however much skill or labour 
may be devoted to the process, cannot make an original 
work.’ (loc. cit, at 371)
The case was re-argued and reconsidered after the court 
was – in the words of Judge Kaplan – ‘bombarded with 
additional submissions’ by Bridgeman. In a second deci-
sion [36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)], the court exclu-
sively applied American law, but ultimately affirmed the 
earlier decision, dismissing the case for the same reasons.
The two cases point at identical questions of copy-
right. Are photographic reproductions of works of art in 
the public domain protected by copyright? This is what 
Bridgeman and the National Portrait Gallery claim. But are 
these reproductions really ‘original’ in the sense of copy-
right law? What is the legal situation in countries other 
than the UK? The following section will analyse the legal 
framework concerned.
2. The copyright status of photographic 
reproductions of works of art in the  
public domain
The question is: are photographic reproductions of works 
of art in the public domain copyrightable? My analysis will 
centre around UK and EU law, with a few digressions into 
US law, taking up the facts of the Bridgeman and National 
Portrait Gallery cases.
2.1 The public domain
This paper will not touch on the question of works of art 
that are still under copyright. Generally, copyright protec-
tion ceases after a certain period, which is defined by the 
applicable law. Historically, the duration of copyright has 
been extended from 14 years in the first copyright act, the 
‘Act of Anne’ (1709, 8 Anne c. 19), to fifty or seventy years 
after the author’s death in most countries. On expiry of 
this term, works are no longer copyright-protected but are 
in the public domain. Consequently, they are free to use, 
and anybody can do that which, before, was the author’s 
exclusive right: this includes the right to make copies and 
to reproduce the work, and to sell these reproductions. 
The Bridgeman Art Library offered reproductions of such 
works. If a work is in the public domain, these reproduc-
tions cannot be exclusive.
Indeed, the Bridgeman Art Library did not contest the 
public domain as such, but maintained that Corel had 
used Bridgeman’s images. However, it can be almost 
impossible to decide from which source a reproduction 
has been made, in particular if there are several images 
in circulation. The Bridgeman Art Library argued that 
some of the works of art were in private collections, to 
which Bridgeman had gained exclusive access, but Judge 
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Kaplan dismissed the argument. It was impossible to 
establish similarities that could prove that Corel had cop-
ied Bridgeman’s images and not anybody else’s: ‘Because, 
by definition, public domain works are not subjects of 
copyright, this cannot serve as the requisite similarity for 
copyright infringement.’ [The Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. 
v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)]. In other 
words, ‘how would one discern whose copies are whose?’ 
(Bielstein 2006: 45). Even if it had been clear that Corel 
had used the Bridgeman images, there would not have 
been an infringement of the copyright in the original 
work, since this had expired, but only of the copyright in 
the reproduction.
The National Portrait Gallery case points to the heart of 
this issue: here it was uncontested that Derrick Coetzee 
had used the images on the NPG’s website. Furthermore, 
the works of art in question were part of the museum’s 
collections. Modern copyright has established that it is 
not the owner of a work of art who is the copyright holder, 
but the creator: possession does not automatically convey 
copyright. Historically, however, museums have been able 
to control reproductions of public-domain images from 
their collections (Butler 1998: 72). In the early nineteenth 
century, when copyright was still in its infancy, the presi-
dent of a French commission debating the role and foun-
dations of copyright observed it to be a rule that the Royal 
Museums acquired the copyright together with any object 
entering their collections (Commission de la propriété lit-
téraire 1826: 278). In this constellation the museum acts 
as the defender of the author’s rights. Although this no 
longer reflects the copyright laws of the 21st century, part 
of the argument seems to inform museums’ actions to 
the present day: even if they do not own the copyright to 
the works in their collection, they might at least own the 
copyright of the reproductions of these works – at least, 
that is their stance (cf. Crews 2012: 806).
2.2 The museums’ view: copyright in reproductions 
and factual monopolies
A Guide to Copyright for Museums and Galleries, published 
in 2000 in association with the UK Museums Copyright 
Group, and supported and endorsed by the Museums and 
Galleries Commission and the Scottish Museums Council, 
states that ‘where there is sufficient skill and labour, copy-
right protection can be given to duplicates’, pointing out 
technical skills such as the prevention of glare, careful 
light meter readings and faithful colours (Wienand, Booy 
and Fry 2000: 16). While it is admitted that this ‘is a highly 
contentious area’ (ibid.), the common practice of muse-
ums and galleries evidently remains unchanged (cf. Crews 
2012: 806; Reese 2009: 1040). In Britain, the Museums 
Copyright Group concluded that the Bridgeman cases had 
‘not influenced the ways museums negotiate or license 
rights’ (Museums Copyright Group 2004). As a rule, muse-
ums claim on their websites that they own copyright to the 
images of the works in their collection, as The Bridgeman 
Art Library still does: ‘The Bridgeman Art Library is the 
copyright holder, or authorised representative of the 
copyright holder, for all photographic transparencies in 
the Bridgeman Art Library.’ For example, the website of 
the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston claims: ‘The Images 
are not simple reproductions of the works depicted and 
are protected by copyright.’ (MFA Boston 2013; see also 
Crews 2012: 822; Mazzone 2011: 17). Such statements, 
it has been remarked, are in complete opposition to the 
court’s decision in the Bridgeman cases (Cameron 2006: 
48; Crews 2012: 808–09; Dobson 2009: 335; Matz 2000: 
4; Mazzone 2011: 15; Wojcik 2008: 259, 271).
2.3 Originality, photography, Graves’ Case and 
recent UK decisions
As Bielstein asks, ‘What does it mean […] to claim that one 
can copyright a copy?’ (2006: 41) Although the standard 
required for a work to qualify as original is indeed very 
low (Garnett 2001: 229–30; Stokes 2012: 50), a frequently 
cited case, University of London Press Ltd v. University 
Tutorial Press Ltd ([1916] 2 Ch. 601), also sets a minimum 
standard: ‘that the work must not be copied from another 
work – that it should originate from the author.’ (ibid., 
per Peterson J at 609). This test of originality is also part 
of other countries’ copyright legislation. Originality has 
been called the ‘bedrock principle of copyright’ by the US 
Supreme Court (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co, 
499 U.S. 340, 347 [1991]). Indeed, despite their diverging 
traditions and concepts of copyright, British and US stand-
ards may not be so different (cf. Cameron 2006: 55–6), 
and the same is true of continental copyright laws in the 
light of European legislation. Specifically regulating pho-
tographs, Art. 6 of the European Council Directive 93/98/
EEC provides that ‘[p]hotographs which are original in the 
sense that they are the author’s own intellectual creation 
shall be protected […]. No other criteria shall be applied to 
determine their eligibility for protection.’
Indeed recent decisions by British courts broach the 
issue of harmonisation between EU and UK laws. Temple 
Island v. New English Teas and Nicholas John Houghton, 
a case in the England and Wales Patents County Court 
heard in November 2011, included an insightful apprecia-
tion of the correlations between European and UK regard-
ing the standard of photographic originality, remarking 
that there was ‘no difference in substance’ between the 
law as applied by the Austrian Supreme Court, the Court 
of Justice of the European Union, and UK law, recapitulat-
ing that a photograph is original ‘in terms of copyright 
law if the task of taking the photograph leaves ample 
room for an individual arrangement’ ([2012] EWPCC 1, at 
para. 20). This takes up the definition of originality from 
the Infopaq decision of the European Court of Justice, 
stating that a work is original when it is an ‘author’s 
own intellectual creation’ (Infopaq International A/S v. 
Danske Dagblades Forening, Case C-5/08, [19 July 2009] 
ECR I-6569, at para. 37), in turn reiterating Art. 6 of the 
European Council Directive 93/98/EEC. The definition 
has since been confirmed in Painer v. Standard Verlags-
GmbH and others (Case C-145/10, [1 December 2011] ECR 
I-12594, at para. 87).
In view of these recent decisions, the resurrection of 
Graves’ Case [(1869) LR 4 QB 715] by authors arguing in 
Petri: The Public Domain vs. the MuseumArt. 8, page 4 of 12 
favour of copyright protection for reproductive photo-
graphs (Garnett 2000: 231) becomes even more doubt-
ful. In this case, Henry Graves, a well-known publisher 
of art reproductions in Victorian Britain, had registered 
photographs of engravings to obtain protection under 
the Fine Arts Copyright Act of 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c.68). 
J. B. Walker, who had sold pirated copies of these repro-
ductions, was charged with the infringement of Graves’ 
copyright and applied to the court to delete the entries 
in the register, arguing that there was no copyright in the 
photographs of the engravings. Blackburn rejected the 
argument, observing that ‘all photographs are copies of 
some object, such as a painting or a statue. And it seems to 
me that a photograph taken from a picture is an original 
photograph, in so far that to copy it is an infringement of 
this statute.’ [(1869) LR 4 QB 715, at 723]. The persuasive 
power of this reasoning is limited; apparently Blackburn 
merely asserted the conclusion, which he supported only 
with his personal view: ‘it seems to me that […]’. Judge 
Kaplan discussed the authority of Graves’ Case in the sec-
ond Bridgeman decision, concluding that it did not reflect 
the subsequent development of the concept of originality 
[36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), at 198].
The limits of the authority of Graves’ Case become even 
clearer if one takes into account the fact that Henry Graves 
was also the copyright owner of the reproduced paint-
ings, as well as the corresponding engravings (cf. Lupton 
1988: 257). To deny Graves copyright protection for his 
photographs would have effectively undermined his copy-
right in the paintings and the engravings, which he also 
owned. In other words, the works in question were not, as 
in the Bridgeman and National Portrait Gallery cases, in 
the public domain; what was at stake was the integrity of 
Graves’ bundle of exclusive rights. Since section 4 of the 
Fine Arts Copyright Act of 1862 provided protection only 
for works listed in the ‘Register of Proprietors of Copyright 
in Paintings, Drawings and Photographs’, it was a prudent 
move on Graves’ part to register all media in order to 
obtain complete protection for all types of use. For these 
reasons, Graves’ Case is not good authority on the origi-
nality of photographs, but rather on the enforcement of 
an effective copyright protection covering all types of use 
(cf. the cautious reflection by Stokes that the specific facts 
in Graves’ Case and the case’s antiquity could make it a 
less than persuasive authority, and it ‘may no longer be 
good law’ (2012: 137)). Both Bridgeman v. Corel and the 
facts in the dispute of the National Portrait Gallery with 
Wikimedia Commons should be clearly distinguished 
from Graves’ Case.
The historical distance to Graves’ Case highlights one 
particular aspect of those voices resting their argument 
on that case - an argument, by the way, that attempts to 
take advantage of the historical campaign for the copy-
right protection of photographs as such – which is that 
this issue was the subject of considerable and highly 
emotional debate at the end of the nineteenth century. 
The prevailing view on photography was far more mecha-
nistic than it is today. Eastman Kodak’s slogan, ‘You press 
the button, we do the rest’, was a popular advertisement, 
which summed up the common belief that a photograph 
was the result of an ingenious piece of machinery, the 
pre-determined product of an optical-chemical and 
mechanical process. Artist-photographers had to fight 
to obtain copyright protection for their works (see for 
example Bigeon 1894). However, emphasising, on the 
one hand, that photographs deserve the same protec-
tion as other works of art while, on the other, assert-
ing that photography has suffered from its supposedly 
industrial nature, and arguing that every photograph is 
‘more or less a copy of something else’ (Garnett 2000: 
229) belies a sophisticated understanding of what pho-
tography is. Speaking of a portrait painter ‘copying the 
physical attributes and appearance’ of a sitter (Ong 2010: 
170) hardly does justice to the process (cf. the refined 
approach by Malkan 2005: 427–8). In photography, the 
relationship between originals and copies is complicated 
by the dual origin of the photograph itself, which com-
prises both creative and mechanical elements (Malkan 
2005: 439). The historical argument that photography 
is a potentially artistic medium should not be confused 
with a claim that all photographs are original. While it is 
true, as Allan (2007: 977) observes, that just because a 
process is laborious and requires technical skill does not 
make it unoriginal and uncreative, the opposite conclu-
sion would be equally as flawed: labour and skill alone do 
not constitute an original process. A photograph can be 
as artistic as a painting, but it is not always, just as it can 
be of an industrial nature, but is not always. To state that 
every photograph is also a copy, would mean reiterating 
the mechanistic standpoint that was criticised in the first 
place. Taken together, the statements are self-contradic-
tory; interpreted separately, they project elements of 
an individual photograph on the concept of photogra-
phy as a medium. But it is not only the concept of origi-
nality that has made progress since 1869, it is also our 
understanding of what photography is. This convoluted 
approach to photography by some legal authors is irritat-
ing, because Garnett (2000: 234) himself observes that 
the medium itself is not the entire message: ‘it depends 
on how it is used.’
2.4 Originality v. skill and reproductive translations
In an obiter dictum of Interlego, Lord Oliver had ques-
tioned whether Walter v. Lane’s skill and labour standard 
should be applied to copies, averring that ‘[s]kill, labour 
or judgment merely in the process of copying could not 
confer originality.’ ([1988] RPC, 343, at 371; cf. Judge and 
Gervais 2009: 395). In Walter v. Lane ([1900] AC 539), 
the defendant had re-published the plaintiff’s – The 
Times’ – transcripts of five parliamentary speeches. The 
House of Lords emphasised the irrelevance of original-
ity in the decision on authorship, but, as Deazley (2001a: 
180) remarks, the relevant Copyright Act of 1842 did not 
incorporate the requirement of originality, which renders 
the precedent unconvincing. Nevertheless, in their most 
recent edition, the authors of Copinger & Skone James 
on Copyright (2010: 3–144) claim that Lord Oliver’s oft-
quoted obiter dictum is inconsistent with Walter v. Lane 
and therefore ‘must now be considered, as a generality, 
to be wrong’. The latter decision being more than one 
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hundred years old, the use of the word ‘now’ in Copinger 
is surprising, all the more so as Interlego had made refer-
ence to Walter v. Lane.
Furthermore, the suggested analogy between the pho-
tographer reproducing two-dimensional works of art and 
the ‘reporter who faithfully reproduces the spoken word 
of a speaker, and whose work was protected in Walter v. 
Lane’ (Garnett 2000: 236; Garnett is one of the authors 
of the recent edition of Copinger & Skone James) does 
not hold: the reporter translates the spoken word into 
a text, whereas the photographer reproduces an image. 
The reporter creates a work in a new medium directed at 
a different sense: speech is for hearing, the report is for 
seeing / reading. In contrast, the photographer of a paint-
ing only reiterates its visual message. The case of the pho-
tographer of a sculpture further clarifies the difference: 
he translates a three-dimensional object, which can also 
be appreciated by the sense of touch, into an image that 
can be appreciated only visually. Conversely, in Martin v. 
Polyplas Manufacturers Ltd. ([1969] NZLR 1046) the plain-
tiff had produced three-dimensional plastic engravings 
from two-dimensional drawings, which incidentally is 
why that case cannot be compared to Bridgeman v. Corel 
as Stokes (2012: 138) proposes to do. Following Alexander 
Baumgarten, who defined aesthetics as the science of the 
experiences of the senses (cf. Baumgarten 1750: 6), these 
sensory translations and potentials become relevant to 
the distinction between original and other works.
The case of photographs seems even more unclear given 
that mezzotint reproductions of paintings have been held 
to be original derivative works under US law (Alfred Bell 
& Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, at 104). However, 
non-photographic means of reproduction, such as engrav-
ing and mezzotint, do include an element of translation, 
namely from colour to black and white, and from shades 
of colour to the graphic language of lines, stipples, or 
cross-hatching (cf. Butler 1998: 84). Engravings are cre-
ated using lines and stipples in a variety of densities, 
while mezzotint is a technique that uses shades of grey 
from a pre-treated copper-plate. Both involve personal 
intellectual choices in terms of a design following the 
visual grammar of the medium employed. Modern pho-
tography does not involve the same kind of choices; its 
aim is a faithful reproduction based on the test of visual 
consistency, a comparison of original and reproduction. 
Photographs serve as surrogate images (Butler 1998: 116). 
Indeed, as Ginsburg (2003: 1083) observes, the easier the 
technology makes it to produce quality reproductions, 
‘the less the copyist’s skill should be equated with author-
ship even in a Commonwealth jurisdiction.’ This does not 
mean that the originality standard has shifted, as Cameron 
(2006: 37) suggests, rather it signifies a distinction based 
on different reproductive techniques, which is consistent 
with the originality test as defined by Lord Atkinson in 
MacMillan & Co. Ltd v. Cooper ([1924] 130 L.T.R. 675, at 
678–79): ‘labour, skill and capital expended should be suf-
ficient to impart to the product some quality or character, 
which the raw material did not possess, and which differ-
entiates the product from the raw material.’ Photography 
is still the benchmark technology when it comes to visual 
reproduction, because it does not add quality or character 
to the work of art reproduced, and it does not call for an 
original translation into another artistic medium such as 
engraving or mezzotint, where the categories of Walter v. 
Lane would be appropriate. Instead of translating the vis-
ual impact of a work of art, a photographic reproduction 
attempts to conserve that impression with the help of its 
technical qualities and mechanisms. 
2.5 Why the subject matters: characteristics of 
photographic copies of works of art
While the authors mentioned are correct in their under-
standing of photography as a medium that is a mixture of 
creative and mechanical processes, and in one sense always 
a copy of its object of representation, they fail to acknowl-
edge that the subject of a photograph does matter when 
deciding on its originality. Indeed, it might even matter 
in other media, as the case of Appropriation Art suggests. 
Appropriation Art is a direction in postmodern art, which, 
among other intentions, aims to undermine copyright 
concepts and the corresponding aesthetics of originality 
by seemingly faithfully copying other works of art. In the 
second Bridgeman v. Corel decision, Judge Kaplan referred 
to the non-copyrightability of works of Appropriation Art 
– since they are not original, they cannot be protected. 
The reality of copies in the visual arts is more complex 
than the brief paragraph in Copinger & Skone James indi-
cates. Their statement that ‘the photograph ought to be 
entitled to copyright protection, irrespective of its subject 
matter’, is a bold one, because it generalises and oversim-
plifies. The short taxonomy offered by Judge and Gervais 
(2009: 377) is helpful in this context:
‘Literary and artistic works are the result of one or more 
of three types of choices: technical choices, those that are 
essentially dictated by the technique used (e.g., in paint-
ing or photography, or certain forms of poetry); functional 
choices, those dictated by the function that a utilitarian 
work will serve (e.g., a chair must not collapse when some-
one is sitting on it); and finally creative choices, those that 
truly stem from the author and where, if someone else has 
produced the work, there would most likely have been a 
different result.’
Reproductive photographs are not the result of the 
third type of choices but only of the first and second: they 
are the outcome of technical preconditions such as light, 
distance, etc., and the functional purpose of rendering 
the original work of art as faithfully as possible (see Butler 
1998: 119–22, quoting the handbook ‘How to Photograph 
Works of Art’ by Sheldan Collins). Antoine Latreille (2002: 
300) suggests a similar model; he distinguishes (1) an 
active composition of the photographer, who creatively 
decides on the subject and its constellation, (2) a passive 
composition, where the photographer decides on tech-
nical issues such as angle, focus, light, etc., correspond-
ing to the functional choices mentioned above, and (3) 
a fixed composition, limiting the photographer’s choices 
to technical issues. In conclusion, in certain situations, 
such as a faithful reproduction, a photograph is not ‘un 
œuvre d’esprit’ (Latreille 2002: 299). In their 1969 hand-
book The Graphic Reproduction and Photography of Works 
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of Art, John Lewis and Edwin Smith clearly state for the 
reproductive photography of two-dimensional works of 
art: ‘Most forms of photography involve choice, at least 
of a view-point, of lighting and of exposure. Here there is 
none.’ (Lewis and Smith 1969: 49).
It is here that the ‘visual significance’ put forward by 
Lord Oliver in Interlego ([1988] RPC, 343, at 374) becomes 
legally significant as a response to the view harking back 
to Graves’ Case, ‘that every photograph is more or less a 
copy of something else’ (Garnett 2000: 229; cf. Graves v. 
Walker (1869) LR 4 QB 715, at 723: ‘All photographs are 
copies of some object […].’), because this view does not 
take into account that some photographs are nothing 
more than a copy of something else, or, in the words of 
Latreille (2002: 304), the photographer of a reproduc-
tion does not bring forward his own vision but the artist’s 
whose work he is reproducing (cf. Butler 1998, 102–03; 
Malkan 2005: 458; contra Allan 2007: 972; Bently and 
Sherman 2009: 110; Lehment 2008: 36–7). Even an oppo-
nent of the Bridgeman decisions admits that ‘the repro-
ductions really do look like the underlying works’. (Allan 
2007: 977; cf. Ong 2010: 180: ‘the idea expressed is the 
copyrightable expression found in the antecedent work’ – 
in other words, not a personal expression).
The European Court of Justice has emphasised very 
clearly in Painer v. Standard Verlags-GmbH and others that 
‘copyright is liable to apply only in relation to a subject-
matter, such as a photograph, which is original in the 
sense that it is its author’s own intellectual creation. As 
stated in recital 17 in the preamble to Directive 93/98, 
an intellectual creation is an author’s own if it reflects 
the author’s personality. That is the case if the author was 
able to express his creative abilities in the production of 
the work by making free and creative choices […].’ (Case 
C-145/10, [1 December 2011] ECR I-12594, at paras. 
87–89). These criteria are also reflected in Temple Island 
v. New English Teas and Nicholas John Houghton ([2012] 
EWPCC 1, at s.20), where Judge Colin Birss QC stated: ‘A 
photograph […] can have the character of an artistic work 
in terms of copyright law if the task of taking the photo-
graph leaves ample room for an individual arrangement. 
What is decisive are the arrangements (motif, visual angle, 
illumination, etc.) selected by the photographer himself 
or herself.’
Faithful reproductions, which can be measured against a 
technical standard, do not allow for these creative choices 
and individual arrangements. Comparing different repro-
ductions with each other and with the original, it will be 
possible to agree on the best, which will be the most faith-
ful. For a variety of original photographs, this category is 
likely to be fruitless. In the terminology of semiotics, copy-
right does not protect pure icons, only those signs that are 
also symbols.
The question has been posed why an ‘opportunistic 
photograph’ of somebody happening to be at the right 
place at the right time, such as a tourist’s photograph of 
Buckingham palace, is original enough to be copyright 
protected, but the reproduction of a two-dimensional art-
work, which requires considerably more skill and labour, 
should not (Garnett 2000: 235). The answer is that the 
tourist’s photograph is unique and personal; the repro-
duction is not. It is a copy. It does not originate with the 
photographer, it originates with the author of the orig-
inal – a fact that Allan (2007: 972) seems to disregard. 
The minimum personal intellectual achievement is not 
given – the achievement is intellectual, but not personal 
(Nordemann 1987: 18; contra Garbers-v. Boehm 2011: 
155). The comparison of the snapshot and the repro-
duction tries to reintroduce an aspect of artistic quality 
to the analysis of originality, which is alien to copyright 
(on this aspect cf. Rahmatian 2005: 373). The ‘opportun-
istic photograph’ might not be original in its technique 
or aesthetics, but it will always be original in that it con-
veys the personality of its maker (cf. Temple Island v. New 
English Teas and Nicholas John Houghton [2012] EWPCC 
1, at s.51). If a reproduction conveys the personality of its 
maker, it is not a good reproduction (Malkan 2005: 434). 
While a reproductive ‘photograph is different in qual-
ity and character from the painting [and] has different 
attributes and different uses’ (Garnett 2000: 236; cf. Allan 
2007: 978), these differences stem exclusively from the 
relation between an original and its copy. For example, 
colour differences are not a personal contribution from 
the photographer but an inadequacy (Butler 1998: 111). 
These changes do not transform the copy into an origi-
nal, and to repeat the contrary by introducing concepts 
such as the authorship of a copy (Ong 2010: 179) does 
nothing to make the argument any more convincing (see 
Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales USA., Inc., 528 F.3d 
1258 (10th Cir. 2008), at 1267).
In other words, while acknowledging that the artistic 
level required for copyright protection is low, and that 
copyright has been conferred on simple works (Garnett 
2000: 230), reproductive photographs are not of a low 
artistic quality: they are not artistic at all. Nor are they 
meant to be; as Malkan (2005: 425) puts it: ‘Copies can 
be authorized, but only works can be authored.’ The very 
faithfulness to the original of the Bridgeman Library’s 
copies was their greatest asset – ‘artistic’ or ‘original’ repro-
ductions would not be marketable, because they would 
not serve their purpose. The commercial value of photo-
graphic reproductions is based on their unoriginality. In 
consequence, copyright is not an appropriate means of 
protecting their market.
2.6 Two- and three-dimensional works
However, an important distinction must be made 
between three-dimensional and two-dimensional objects 
(cf. Bielstein 2006: 40). True, a philosopher might argue 
that no such thing as a two-dimensional object exists; 
it would be more appropriate to speak of objects, of 
which only one side needs to be reproduced to represent 
it in its entirety. Plainly, this is the difference between 
sculpture (three-dimensional) and works such as paint-
ings, drawings, and prints (commonly referred to as 
two-dimensional). Reproductions of three-dimensional 
objects necessitate a creative choice that goes beyond 
purely technical decisions, for example from which angle 
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the object is photographed, or the photograph(er)’s 
focus (cf. Antiquesportfolio.com plc v. Rodney Fitch & Co, 
[2001] E.C.D.R., 51, at 59; Cameron 2006: 42–3; Garbers-v. 
Boehm 2011: 140–50; Stang 2009: 177; but cf. also the 
doubts raised by Wojcik 2008: 266–7). Each reproductive 
photograph of a sculpture is likely to be different. Each 
reproductive photograph of a painting or print can be 
different, but for purely technical reasons – reproductive 
photographs of two-dimensional works of art are meant 
to be exact and identical, or what is commonly referred 
to as a ‘slavish copy’. While there are also works that are 
more difficult to classify as two- or three-dimensional, 
such as paintings including three-dimensional objects, 
like Kurt Schwitters’ collages (cf. Allan 2007: 978), Stokes’ 
comment that it ‘is hard to see how a court could reason-
ably make a distinction between photographs of two- and 
three-dimensional items’ (2012: 139) is solely relying on 
the argument of the common labour and skill needed for 
both sorts of photograph and thereby missing the point 
of originality.
2.7 Conclusion
There is no copyright in photographic reproductions 
of two-dimensional works of art in the public domain. 
Consequently, under US law, the Bridgeman cases ‘still 
stand for, at the very least, the important and distinct prin-
ciple that exact replications of public domain works war-
rant no copyright protection’ (Dobson 2009: 347). Taking 
into account recent European and UK case decisions, it is 
reasonable to state that the same principles are also valid 
for UK law.
It is possible that an analysis by the National Portrait 
Gallery’s lawyers came to the similar conclusions, which 
might have been one of the reasons behind the decision 
not to sue Derrick Coetzee. While the fact that the high-
resolution images provided by the National Portrait Gallery 
were accessible only using the Zoomify software and had 
to be stitched together might constitute a circumvention 
of technical protection measures (cf. sect. 296 CDPA), 
works in the public domain do not actually fall within the 
scope of this regulation (Garbers-v. Boehm 2011: 217–18; 
see also Art. 6, ect. 3 of the Directive 2001/29/EC, linking 
technological measures to protected works). Furthermore, 
the Zoomify technology is not a very effective means to 
control access to the higher-resolution image (cf. Stokes 
2012: 160: ‘clearly a matter of fact’).
3. The business of copyright, copyfraud, and 
museum ethics
In view of these findings, what is the significance of muse-
ums’ and agencies’ disregard for the law (see above, 2.2)?
3.1 Re-appropriation of the public domain as a 
fundraising strategy
Museums re-appropriate works in the public domain 
through their practice of claiming copyright protection 
for their reproductions, thereby arbitrarily extending the 
copyright term. Susan Bielstein (2006: 38) and others 
speak of the ‘privatisation of the public domain’, Kathleen 
Butler (1998: 74) of a circumvention of the public domain, 
and Ronan Deazley (2001a: 183) of a ‘de facto perpetual 
monopoly over the commercial reproduction of publicly 
owned works of art’. The opposite view, namely that copy-
right protection for reproductions does not change the 
public-domain status of the original work is admittedly 
based on the assumption ‘that the antecedent work was 
accessible to the public’ (Ong 2010: 185), a condition that 
is, however, rarely met in real life, thereby devaluing this 
consideration (cf. Cameron 2006: 57–8; Deazley 2001b: 
601; Reese 2009: 1047; Stang 2009: 208).
As Tuchmann (2001: 313) observes, the core issue for 
museums has always been access and aesthetic control, 
not copyright, except as an instrumentality of that access 
and control. Similarly, in her analysis of French museums 
and their position vis-à-vis copyright law, Sonia Tapissier-
Gicquel concludes that it would be more transparent to 
charge service fees for reproductions instead of copyright 
fees. From the perspective of museums, however, this 
would imply a loss of control of the image as is currently 
provided by copyright regulations. Furthermore, she 
observes, the declaration as copyright fees allows the RMN 
to charge higher fees (Tapissier-Gicquel 2004: 130–131). 
This hints at the real problem. The reasons behind the 
museums’ claim on copyright are factual and prosaic. As 
the Guide to Copyright for Museums and Galleries bluntly 
states: ‘In order for museums to raise income from mer-
chandising, licensing or the commercial “development” 
of any part of their collections, the museum must quite 
simply build, somehow, exclusive rights to its collections.’ 
(Wienand, Booy and Fry, 2000: 52). While copyright is not 
something that can be ‘built’, and the factual construc-
tion of copyright in works of art in the public domain 
remains a pretension, one ‘can understand the museums’ 
motivation to take this position.’ (Reese 2009: 1040; see 
also Latreille 2002: 302). Licence fees may become an 
increasingly important source of income in times of eco-
nomic crisis, when museums and galleries are forced to 
raise money.
However, while it has been stated that licensing fees 
constitute ‘an essential source of revenue’ (Cameron 2006: 
32), the facts remain unclear in most cases, and some rev-
enue figures seem to indicate a rather limited market and 
significance (cf. Deazley 2010: 109–10; Hamma 2005). 
In our digital age, servicing image orders has become 
less labour-intensive and time-consuming, thus reducing 
service costs (cf. Allen 2009: 29; Ballon and Westermann 
2006: 31). It has become doubtful whether a truly pub-
lic domain encompassing the reproductions of its two-
dimensional works of art would, as Deazley (2001a: 184) 
asserts, have serious financial implications for the cultural 
institutions concerned (but cf. Kelly 2013: 29). The cur-
rent WIPO Guide on Managing Intellectual Property for 
Museums analyses recent developments in museums’ 
business models and concludes that ‘the making available 
of museum images is merely a means to a commercial end, 
and not the end itself’, pointing out that ‘providing unfet-
tered access to museum images is actually good business’ 
(Pantalony 2007: 98–99). One of Kelly’s conclusions is very 
Petri: The Public Domain vs. the MuseumArt. 8, page 8 of 12 
clear in this regard as well: ‘Real and perceived gains far 
outweigh the real and perceived losses for every museum 
in the study that has made a transition to an open access 
approach’ (Kelly 2013: 24).
The present situation is an unsatisfactory double-bind, 
as described by Cameron (2006: 61): because the rev-
enue from licensing images ‘will enable the museum to 
continue protecting the public domain works already in 
its collection […], museums are both serving the public 
by preserving this art and harming the public by falsely 
claiming copyright in public domain images.’ The opposi-
tion is formulated differently in the ICOM Code of Ethics 
for Museums, 2006, in section 1.9 – ‘The governing body 
should ensure that there are sufficient funds to carry out 
and develop the activities of the museum.’ – and section 
3.2: ‘Museums have a particular responsibility for mak-
ing collections and all relevant information available as 
freely as possible, […].’ To return once more to the National 
Portrait Gallery, their website states: ‘The Gallery’s image 
licensing department raises money by licensing repro-
ductions, thus supporting both the free entry policy and 
the Gallery’s main functions caring for its Collection and 
engaging people with its works.’
3.2 Copyright overreaching, museum ethics and the 
public mission of museums
Nonetheless, to quote a recent essay on copyright, ‘Law 
is not the solution to business problems’ (Patry 2011: 
141). Furthermore, the codes of ethics for museums also 
include an acknowledgement of the legal position, for 
example stating that ‘All those who work for or govern 
museums should ensure that they […] make all policy and 
practice at the museum comply with the law.’ (section 
2.8). The ICOM Code of Ethics includes similar provisions, 
stating (in section 7.1): ‘Museums should conform to all 
national and local laws and respect the legislation of other 
states as they affect their operation.’ At present, however, 
the suggestion is that many museums’ practice in rights 
and reproductions does not comply with UK copyright 
law. Instead, it is a widespread practice to contract around 
copyright law with terms and conditions regulating access 
to works in the public domain and their reproductions 
(Mazzone 2011: 95–100; see also Bohannan 2008 on con-
tract clauses and copyright policy), notwithstanding that 
such contracts cannot legitimately be used to bypass cop-
yright law but must respect it (Wojcik 2008: 269, 279–84). 
As Crews (2012: 821) has clearly stated: ‘any restrictions 
beyond the reach of copyright are in defiance of the law 
and the social and intellectual objectives that copyright 
aims to serve.’
Within the European Union, this means that contracts 
bypassing essential principles of copyright law can be 
problematic in view of the Council Directive 93/13/EEC 
of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (cf. 
s.6 (1) in the UK’s Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999). The museums’ ‘abusive practices’ 
(Latreille 2002: 302) with regard to reproductions of 
two-dimensional works of art in the public domain are in 
breach of copyright law, irrespective of these institutions’ 
dire economic situation, and irrespective of whether this 
practise is called ‘copyfraud’ (Mazzone 2006: 1041–2; 
Mazzone 2011, passim) or ‘copyright overreaching’ (Crews 
2012: 795). ‘Wrong life cannot be lived rightly’ (Adorno: 
1974, 39).
On the other hand, is it ethical to download digital 
reproductions and to make them available in an open 
repository such as Wikimedia Commons? From the per-
spective of copyright law, Derrick Coetzee copied repro-
ductions of two-dimensional works of art in the public 
domain, and was entitled to do so. However, he did not 
act in accordance with the terms and conditions as set 
out on the National Portrait Gallery’s website. Then again, 
these terms were not actually in line with copyright law. 
Metaphorically, Coetzee did not set somebody else’s 
chicken free; he freed a chicken that did not belong to any 
specific farmer and should not even be living on a farm in 
any case. Thus, the time has come to move past the logic 
of copyright pretensions in regard to reproductions of 
works of art in the public domain.
To return to Adorno’s ‘right life’, museums need to set 
aside their rhetoric of copyright and wake up to their mis-
sion. ‘Citizens should be encouraged to reproduce and 
make use of public domain materials, not treated as though 
they are breaking the law.’ (Mazzone 2006: 1060). This is 
true whether the copyfraudster is a private company, such 
as the Bridgeman Art Library, or a public museum. Neither 
holds any copyright in reproductions of two-dimensional 
works of art in the public domain. However, public institu-
tions such as museums are on a public mission, as Ronan 
Deazley (2001a: 183) reminds us. Their ‘pictures belong 
to the public, and are (for the most part) […] in the public 
domain.’ The ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums states in 
section 2: ‘Museums that maintain collections hold them 
in trust for the benefit of society and its development.’ 
Meanwhile, the Code of Ethics for Museums published by 
the UK Museums Association states: ‘Society can expect 
museums to hold collections in trust on behalf of society, 
[…] encourage people to explore collections for inspiration, 
learning and enjoyment, […] research, share and interpret 
information related to collections.’ Public collections’ 
trusteeship includes the dissemination of reproductions 
for non-commercial purposes. Marie Cornu and Nathalie 
Mallet-Poujol (2006: 314) argue that the public display of 
an object includes the willingness to communicate that 
object’s appearance and a fortiori its image, with the res-
ervations of a possible – real, not merely fictitious – copy-
right in the object. Indeed, in Allan’s words (2007: 983) 
museums are ‘the proper institutions to entrust with the 
public dissemination of high-quality reproductions of a 
broad range of works of art.’ Recently this view has gained 
prominence with an interview given to the New York 
Times by the Director of Collections at the Rijksmuseum, 
Taco Dibbits, who is quoted saying ‘If they want to have a 
Vermeer on their toilet paper, I’d rather have a very high-
quality image of Vermeer on toilet paper than a very bad 
reproduction’ (Siegal 2013). ‘Keeping the World Safe from 
Naked-Chicks-in-Art Refrigerator Magnets’ (Butler 1998) 
is no longer a realistic option. The recent developments 
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in open access policy in the UK, Europe and the USA will 
put further pressure on museums and public collections 
to make their images accessible, as the underlying ration-
ale is essentially identical: in the last five or so years major 
research funders have implemented policies to promote 
open access to the published findings of the research 
they fund (see Finch 2012: 34). Publicly funded research 
should be made accessible to the public. In a similar way, 
publicly funded art collections should be made accessible. 
For works in the public domain this means permitting 
unrestricted access to their reproductions, unhampered 
by copyright overreaching.
4. Reproductions reconsidered
So how could the mission of cultural partnership be devel-
oped in post-copyright categories?
4.1 Accessibility of the works for private 
photography
The question of a right to access to the public collec-
tions is still in a ‘chaotic’ state (Cornu and Mallet-Poujol 
2006: 308). Many museums allow photography in their 
rooms (but the use of flashes is in most cases prohibited 
due to conservatorial concerns). In France, an adminis-
trative decree dating from 1979 (Journal officiel, 6 April 
1979: 3047) established that photography for private use 
was permitted as far as permanent collections of public 
museums were concerned, but not for works on show 
in temporary exhibitions (see Cornu and Mallet-Poujol 
2006: 312). In contrast, Wienand, Booy and Fry (2000: 55), 
advise museums in the UK not to allow photography in 
their galleries. The National Portrait Gallery runs a strict 
policy: ‘We also exert strict controls on all photography in 
the Gallery, which is allowed only on the understanding 
that copyright rests with us and that any further repro-
duction deriving from resulting photographic materi-
als is subject to our written permission.’ (NPG Website: 
Copyright). Photography is not permitted at the Tate 
either, whereas it is at the Victoria & Albert Museum and 
the British Museum. In view of public museums’ educa-
tional mission, Bullinger (2006: 395–6) and Garbers-v. 
Boehm (2011: 292) raise doubts about a general ban on 
photography in museums.
A short, non-representative survey on websites such as 
Flickr and Picasa provides a mixed impression. Very few 
images of works of art could serve publishing purposes. 
Most private photographs are too individual and far from 
representing a professional reproduction. These images 
combine the subject matter of a reproduction with the sty-
listic characteristics of ‘occasional photographs’ – a warped 
picture plane, uneven sharpness and lighting, unfaith-
ful colours. These kinds of photographs are not serious 
competition in the market of professional art reproduc-
tions. Not being of a commercial concern in terms of the 
market, private photographs without flash and tripods 
should therefore be permitted in public museums, at least 
in rooms that display works in the public domain. More 
professional photography may interfere with a museum’s 
everyday exhibition and display routines. Paintings might 
have to be taken out of their frames, a suitable room 
would have to be found, where the photography would 
not disturb other visitors. These procedures are cost-inten-
sive. While it should be possible for professional photog-
raphers to create such high-quality reproductions, there is 
no need for a public museum to subsidise these activities 
(cf. Bullinger 2006: 395).
4.2 An offer that can’t be refused
Reese (2009: 1041) has pointed out certain common 
interests in reproductions of works of art in the public 
domain. All parties have a preference for high-quality 
reproductions, sharp, in a high resolution and with the 
correct colours. He proposes ‘a sui generis system of lim-
ited protection for art reproduction photos’ with a shorter 
term of protection of between five and twenty-five years, 
a limitation of the protected rights to reproductions, and 
the duty to deposit the image in question in a repository, 
where, on the expiry of the term of protection, the pub-
lic could access the image without having to deal with 
the museum (Reese 2009: 1048–9). While the latter idea 
would strengthen the public domain, the proposal also 
denotes an endorsement of the factual prolongation of 
the copyright term as is current practice, which is why 
other solutions are preferable. An alternative regime to 
copyright in regard to reproductions of works in the pub-
lic domain might prove beneficial to the museums. Taking 
the approach to ‘Commercialise Authoritative Content’ 
(Pantalony 2007: 80–82) seriously, the museums’ market 
position with regard to reproductions can be strength-
ened if they offer a surplus value such as the best quality, 
additional art-historical information, and the aura of the 
original (cf. Tuchmann 2001: 315; see also Pfennig 2009: 
141; Stang 2009: 216). Some users such as art historians 
may be willing to pay a premium for authenticity and 
accuracy (Reese 2009: 1042); other users such as advertis-
ing agencies may be willing to pay for the highest possible 
quality (Matz 2000: 19). Commercial users still come to 
the National Portrait Gallery to obtain the best reproduc-
tions available (cf. Morgan 2010: 39’00”). Part of a service 
fee for the use of a collection’s reproductive image might 
be advertised as supporting the educational aims of the 
museum. Awareness of social values has grown in recent 
years, and a considerable proportion of the public is pre-
pared to support charities with donations (cf. Reese 2009: 
1042). Exploitation of the collection for merchandising 
products such as coffee mugs, tea towels, underwear or 
inflatable figures can be protected by trademark laws 
(Reese 2009: 1042–43) or unfair competition laws (Matz 
2000: 22) rather than copyright law.
The securement of exclusivity, as proposed by Wienand, 
Booy and Fry 2000: 53, like the music industry’s battle 
against downloads, is bound to fail. Apple’s iTunes and 
internet platforms such as Amazon, which are easy to use, 
offer a transparent system of rights management, and 
fair pricing, thereby providing a proof of concept for the 
management of museum reproductions (cf. Tuchmann 
2001: 315, mentioning the ease of access as a reason why 
services such as Bridgeman’s will endure; Morgan and 
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Minet 2012: 55, advocating a flagship centralised image 
licensing agency for museums and galleries in the UK). 
The fees furthermore have to be reasonable in order to 
comply with the public museums’ mission (Garbers-v. 
Boehm 2011: 295–6). As Maria Economou has shown in 
her paper for this conference, museums can enter suc-
cessful partnerships with web 2.0 communities such as 
Flickr; examples include the Brooklyn Museum and the 
Smithsonian Institution (see also Allen 2009: 25). The loss 
of control of images is a fact in the digital age, but not 
necessarily a commercial risk, as a curator of the Walter 
Art Museum in Baltimore admits: ‘We have lost almost all 
control, and this has been vital to our success’ (quoted in 
Kelly 2013: 28).
Museum ethics are not one-sided. The visitors and 
website users are obliged to contribute to a successful 
partnership. After all, the museum is working on behalf 
of the public. In his talk at the Wikipedia conference in 
November 2010, the National Portrait Gallery’s Tom 
Morgan justifiably appealed for the public’s respect for 
the cultural content offered by the gallery (Morgan 2010: 
42’10”). A museum should be credited when its reproduc-
tions are used and re-published. Interestingly, the con-
cept of moral rights, which has only recently entered the 
spheres of Anglo-American copyright legislation, seems 
appropriate, in that the producer of a reproduction of a 
work of art in the public domain should have the right to 
be credited as reproducer (cf. Crews 2012: 816–17; Smiers 
and van Schijndel 2009: 64). Moreover, there are historical 
precedents of photographic reproductions being famous 
for their quality, for example Franz Hanfstaengl’s photo-
lithographs or Goupil’s photogravures in the nineteenth 
century.
If museums offer this kind of service, the question of 
a service fee arises. If museums provide the public with 
high-quality reproductions, they can expect to be paid 
for their services, not least as part of the desired respect 
(cf. Crews 2012: 806). However, commercial and non-
commercial users should be charged different rates. If a 
global player needs a high-quality reproduction of the 
Mona Lisa to promote his product, he should pay a fee to 
support the cultural field he is making use of: the muse-
ums and the visual heritage they administer. Underpaid 
academics publishing books with an average readership 
of a few dozen experts should not have to pay as much, 
since they pursue non-commercial interests. In the USA, 
where the doctrine of ‘fair use’ is more prominent than 
its British equivalent, ‘fair dealing’, the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art in 2007 launched an ‘Images for Academic 
Publishing’ initiative to provide scholars with high-quality 
images from its collection free of charge (see Allen 2009: 
15–21). The Library of Congress makes clear that it does 
not own the copyright on the materials in its collections 
also made available on its website (cf. Mazzone 2011: 18). 
The National Gallery of Art in Washington DC follows 
an open access policy for their collection, and the list of 
American institutions offering open access to their collec-
tions is growing and includes highlights such as the Los 
Angeles County Museum of Art and the Yale Center for 
British Art (see Kelly 2013). The recent reopening of the 
Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam was accompanied by a web-
site relaunch comprising freely accessible digital archives 
(cf. Siegal 2013).
In the UK, important institutions have changed com-
mon museum practice and have begun to make their col-
lections available digitally, with the option to download a 
high-quality image suitable for publishing. The Victoria & 
Albert Museum and the British Museum offer this service 
for non-commercial purposes, including academic pub-
lishing (on the V&A’s ‘Search the Collection’ initiative cf. 
Deazley 2010: 109–10; Allen 2009: 21–23). If the image 
of an object in the British Museum’s collections has not 
yet been photographed, a reasonable fee of £60 (approx. 
€70) is incurred. In this way, the first-time user becomes 
the sponsor of a reproduction, since it will be included 
in the digital collection and be freely available. In 2012 
the National Portrait Gallery changed its policy and imple-
mented a new licensing model (see Atkinson 2012), offer-
ing professional and academic licences for high-resolution 
images suitable for publication and a creative commons 
licence for private use suitable for digital presentations. 
This model reflects the considerations of this article. 
Commercial projects incur a fee, whereas, as a rule, the 
fees for illustrations for academic publications are waived. 
(For recent surveys of art museum image licensing poli-
cies in the UK and the USA see Allen 2009; Crews 2010–
12; Kelly 2013; all with further references.)
These examples are encouraging. From personal expe-
rience I know that when it comes to non-commercial 
publishing, many museums’ departments of rights and 
reproductions are extremely helpful and provide conces-
sionary fees wherever possible. However, even lots of good 
individual examples cannot substitute a consistent policy. 
A satisfactory balance between the interests of public 
museums and the interests of the public in reproductions 
cannot be achieved using the categories of copyright. A 
rethink of the approach to reproductions of works in the 
public domain has only just begun.
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